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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cut Zamarah Hamzah was born and raised amid the noise and 
dense smoke of the "petro-city" of Lhok Seumawe, North Aceh.1 
Roughly a mile behind Hamzah' s house was the Rancung building 
belonging to PT Arnn.2 This building is famous among the villagers as 
the center for torture, rape, and execution by the Indonesian military. 3 
Each night Hamzah heard a military van pass by her house and later, the 
sound of gunshots. She would only learn the next day who had been 
taken from their home the night before and led to the Rancung building 
to be tortured or executed.4 It was widely unknown amongst the 
villagers what happened to the bodies of those taken until mass graves 
were discovered within the Cluster 5 site of Exxon Mobil's property. 5 
Aceh is a relatively small province in Northern Sumatra, 
Indonesia. 6 In 1971, Mobil Oil, in conjunction with Pertamina, an 
Indonesian state-owned oil and gas company, discovered a large natural 
gas field in Arnn, an area in the Aceh province.7 Mobil Oil contracted 
with the Indonesian government, which at the time was controlled by a 
military regime led by General Suharto, to obtain exclusive rights for 
exploration and production of natural gas in the Arnn area. 8 Shortly 
thereafter, Mobil Oil built facilities to extract the natural gas while PT 
Arnn developed a natural gas liquefaction facility to process the gas for 
* The author would like to thank Professor Peter Bell for his guidance and feedback on this 
note, and also her family and friends for their support and patience while the note came to 
fruition. 
1. Cut Zahara Hamzah, Testimony on Exxon Mobil Involvement in Human Rights 
Abuses in Aceh, (May 29, 2002), at http:// 
http://www.pacificenvironment.org/stopexxonmobil/aceh_testimony .html (last visited Mar. 
19, 2004). 
2. Id. PT Arun is a tri-national joint venture company of which Mobil Oil Indonesia 
owns 30%, Pertamina owns 55% and JILCO owns 15%. See Petroleum Report Indonesia 
2001, American Embassy Jakarta, at 35, available at 
http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/petroleum/bab-5.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004). 
3. Hamzah, supra note 1. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Complaint, John Doe Iv. Exxon Mobil Corp. et al., at 13 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 01-
1357), at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/exxon/exxoncomplaint. pdf (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2004). 
7. Id. at 12. 
8. Id. 
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shipment. 9 Mobil Oil exercised "ownership and significant control" 
over PT Arun by virtue of its part ownership and its exclusive contract 
to supply PT Arnn with 100% of the natural gas it liquefies and sells. Io 
As part of the agreement between Mobil Oil and the Indonesian 
government, Mobil Oil agreed to provide General Suharto's family with 
"blank shares" in Mobil Oil Indonesia, a subsidiary of Mobil Oil 
Corporation. 11 In exchange, the Suharto regime agreed to provide 
military units of the national army, known as Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia ("TNI"), as security for the company's operations. I2 At least 
one military unit, Number 113, was assigned to the sole purpose of 
providing security to Mobil's project, and received regular 
compensation by Mobil for their services.13 From 1989 to 1998, the 
Indonesian government, under the rule of General Suharto, designated 
Aceh a "military operational area" and directed the military to occupy 
the province to suppress factions in Aceh seeking independence from 
the Indonesian govemment. I4 During this nine-year period, the 
Indonesian military killed, tortured, raped, maimed, and caused many 
villagers to "disappear" under the pretext of operating as security for 
Mobil.Is 
In 1998, with the fall of the tyrannical regime of General Suharto, 
the village became aware that Mobil was funding the military operation 
in Aceh. 16 Mobil provided the facilities where the torture, rape, and 
execution of villagers occurred, as well as paid the salaries of the 
soldiers who burned and robbed the villagers' homes. 17 Worse yet, the 
company continues to compensate the soldiers who kill civilians, rape 
women, and bum villages around the Exxon Mobil complex all in the 
name of protecting the company.18 
Exxon Mobil was created on November 30, 1999 through the 
merger of Exxon Corporation and Mobil Corporation and is the 
successor in interest to all assets and liabilities previously owned by the 
merged entities. 19 When the merger occurred there was "a clear public 
9. Complaint, supra note 6, at 12-13. 
10. Id. at 11. 
11. Id. at 12, 14. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 14-15. 
14. Complaint, supra note 6, at 13-14. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 8. 
17. Hamzah, supra note 1. 
18. Id. 
19. Complaint, supra note 6. 
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record of pervasive and systematic human rights violations" perpetrated 
against the Aceh villagers by the troops hired as security for Mobil and 
PT Arun.20 
This Note focuses on the accountability of multinational 
corporations that commit human rights violations abroad. More 
specifically, this note will focus on whether Exxon Mobil, who reported 
approximately $210 billion in revenue and was listed by Fortune as the 
largest publicly held corporation for the year 2000, may be held liable 
under the Alien Torts Claim Act ("ATCA") for knowingly supporting 
the egregious behavior of the Indonesian military.21 Part I of this Note 
explores the scope of the corporate human rights problem. Part II 
discusses the birth of multinational corporations ("MNCs"). Part III 
examines the history of the A TCA and its recent developments. Finally, 
Part IV argues that Exxon Mobil should be held liable under the A TCA 
for complicity in genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity by 
providing funding, equipment, and facilities to the Indonesian military, 
which was committing human rights violations. 
II. CORPORA TE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM 
Corporations have long been profiting from abusive behavior. 
Although corporate human rights abuses can be traced back to the 
seventeenth century and the British and Dutch East India Companies, 
the Holocaust is perhaps the most graphic example of corporate greed 
leading to human rights violations.22 The Holocaust was also 
instrumental in forming the foundation for modem day corporate 
liability for human rights abuses, in large part because of the worldwide 
reaction to corporations extracting economic gain without regard for 
human harm.23 
World War II 
The full extent of corporations profiting from the Holocaust has 
only recently begun to receive attention.24 Thousands of corporations 
are believed to have profited from the atrocities of the Holocaust. 25 
20. Complaint, supra note 6. 
21. Id. at 8. 
22. Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 45, 49 (2001). 
23. See Lucinda Saunders, Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers 
Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1402, 1450 (2001). 
24. Stephens, supra note 22, at 49. 
25. Id. 
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Delayed investigations have not only made it difficult to know exactly 
how much corporations profited, but also demonstrate the corporations' 
power to conceal their transactions. 26 Legal actions have been filed 
against banking institutions that profited by retaining the assets of those 
killed by the Nazis, as well as by accepting profits resulting from slave 
labor and assets looted by the Nazis.27 At the same time, many 
companies conducted business with Nazi Germany. It has been 
reported that companies such as Siemens, Volkswagen, BMW, and 
Daimler-Benz profited greatly from Jewish forced labor supplied to 
them by the German army. 28 
Furthermore, Allianz, the second largest insurance company in the 
world, failed to pay the life insurance policies of Jewish customers who 
were killed in the Holocaust. 29 In addition, documents were discovered 
in 1997 that revealed the company also insured buildings and civil 
employees of the Auschwitz concentration camp.30 Moreover, 
pharmaceutical companies supplied medication and other equipment 
used in Nazi medical experiments and IBM supplied punch cards for 
Nazi record keeping.31 These cases reveal the extent to which the 
corporate pursuit of profit can lead to human rights violations. 32 Even 
more unsettling is the fact that "profits from these activities enriched 
successor corporations and have been distributed to investors 
throughout much of the W estem world. "33 
The Nuremberg Principles 
After World War II, representatives from the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union met to establish 
procedures for prosecuting Nazi war criminals.34 One result of this 
conference was the Nuremberg Charter, which set forth four grounds 
under which accused war criminals could be indicted.35 The ideas 
26. Id. 
27. Stephens, supra note 22, at 49.; Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks 
and International Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 332 (1998). 
28. Companies and the Holocaust: Industrial Actions, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1998, 
at 75. 
29. John Marks & Jack Egan, Insuring Nazi Death Camps History Catches Up with 
Another German Corporation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 22, 1999, at 52. 
30. Id. 
31 . Stephens, supra note 22, at 50. 
32. Id. at 49. 
33. Id. 
34. Ramasastry, supra note 27, at 395. 
35. Id. The four grounds set forth by the Charter were crimes against the peace, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and common plan or conspiracy. 
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contained in the Charter were particularly significant because it was the 
first time individuals were held to have violated international law. 36 
The Charter's legal principles were later restated by the International 
Law Commission and named the Nuremberg Principles. These 
principles are now recognized as customary international law. 37 
Moreover, the Principles recently served as the basis for liability in a 
suit filed under the A TCA in late 1996 by Holocaust survivors and their 
descendants against Swiss banks alleging that the banks knowingly 
profited from slave labor and stolen property from the Nazi regime. 38 
Modern Day Abuses 
The Holocaust is a distinctive example of corporate human rights 
abuses, but similar concerns persist today. Corporations, "[i]n the 
pursuit of profit and often in partnership with repressive governments, 
violate the right to life, to health, to gainful employment, and to political 
participation. "39 Consequently, corporations increasingly face charges 
levied against them for their complicity in human rights violations.40 
For example, Enron Corporation has been accused of working with the 
Indian police to suppress local residents opposed to an energy project.41 
Also, Royal Dutch Shell has been sued for allegedly conspiring in the 
executions of activists protesting the company's policies in Nigeria.42 
Additionally, Coca-Cola has been accused of complicity in human 
rights violations committed by Columbian paramilitaries hired by the 
managers of a local bottling plant to suppress union efforts.43 Lastly, 
Unocal Corporation has been charged with supporting human rights 
violations committed by the Burmese military hired to protect their oil 
pipeline development. 44 
36. Ramasastry, supra note 27, at 422. 
37. Saunders, supra note 23, at 1450; see J. Starke, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 34-38 (9th ed. 1984) (discussing how customary international law crystallizes over 
time from usages or practices between countries, of international organs, or from a 
concurrence between nations' domestic laws or administrative practices). 
38. Saunders, supra note 23, at 1450. 
39. Stephens, supra note 22, at 51. 
40. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INDIA: THE "ENRON PROJECT" IN 
MAHARASHTRA: PROTESTS SUPPRESSED IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT, Amnesty 
International Index: ASA 20/31/97 (1997). 
41. See id. 
42. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter 
Wiwa II]. 
43. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Complaint, available at http://www.laborrights.org 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2004). 
44. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter 
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These examples underscore the danger that arises when 
corporations either directly or indirectly commit human right violations 
or enter circumstances in which their behavior leads to human rights 
abuses. "Current economic incentives are insufficient to trigger 
voluntary compliance with international human ri~hts standards" and 
sadly the legal system has not faired much better. s However, before 
tackling the problems of regulating these conglomerates and why the 
way they are viewed should be altered, it is helpful to understand the 
history and origin of MN Cs. 
III. THE RISE OF MNCs 
The Birth of MN Cs 
"The fundamental legal attributes of corporate existence had been 
generally recognized as early as the end of the thirteenth century and 
gradually crystallized over the years, forming the common law doctrine 
of corporations."46 The first corporations were creatures of law and 
could only achieve legal status through the King or Parliament.47 Early 
scholars described corporations as being "invisible" and an "artificial 
person. "48 
Corporations upon formation had innate core legal concepts 
including the right to sue and be sued, to contract, to acquire and 
dispose of real and personal property, and to have perpetual life.49 
Furthermore, corporations were granted a seal, which allowed the 
corporate body to act separate from its members.so A corporation was 
thought of as a separate legal unit from its owners, with its rights 
exercisable only by the corporation and not by its individual 
shareholders.st Limited liability, a concept thought to be central to a 
corporation, only became common in the early nineteenth century in the 
U.S. and fifty years later in England.s2 
Unocal I]. 
45. Stephens, supra note 22, at 53. 
46. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: 
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORA TE PERSONALITY 3 ( 1993 ). 
47. Id. at 4. 
48. Id. 
49. Stephens, supra note 22, at 55. 
50. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 4. 
51. Id. at 5. 
52. Id. at 7-19. 
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Corporate Rights 
Although corporations had some core rights, they lacked other 
legal rights possessed by individuals.53 Specifically, jurists of the time 
believed that corporations could not commit personal offenses, such as 
treason or assault, because they were "invisible" and lacked a "soul."54 
Although some of the restrictions on corporate identity were eventually 
rejected, a corporation is still not allowed to appear in court without an 
attorney, even when its president and sole stockholder wants to appear 
pro se, and it was not until the early twentieth century that a corporation 
was held capable of committing a crime that required intent.55 
Early corporations, both in the U.S. and in England, were largely 
portrayed as a delegation of authority by the King to accomplish some 
public purpose. 56 Well into the nineteenth century corporations could 
only be created through some state action; in England it took the form 
of a Charter from the King or Parliament, and in the U.S., a legislative 
act. 57 It was not until after the Civil War that general incorporation 
statutes allowing people to utilize the corporate form, became 
common. 58 Over time, the trend toward general incorporation and 
industrialization changed the purpose of corporations from serving 
public goals to generating profit. 59 
Obstacles to Market Domination 
There was a generally accepted rule, due in large part to hostility 
towards monopolies and corporations in general, that one corporation 
could not hold stock in another.60 This rule persisted at common law 
and, in some states, as statutory law for the most part of the nineteenth 
century.61 Even with this limitation, large dominating groups began 
forming in the late nineteenth century as trusts. 62 A trust gave corporate 
control to a trustee who held shares of formerly competing companies in 
trust for beneficial owners. 63 Beneficial owners continued to receive the 
53. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 3-7. 
54. Id. at 5. 
55. Id. at 4. 
56. Id. at 22. 
57. Id. 
58. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 22. 
59. Id. at 7. 
60. Id. at 52-54. 
61. Id. at 54. 
62. Id. at 55. 
63. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 55. 
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economic benefits of ownership, while the trustees exercised the power 
to vote and controlled the companies in question, thereby permitting 
domination of the relevant markets. 64 Two markets primarily controlled 
through trusts were oil, by Rockefeller, and sugar, by the Havemeyers.65 
As antitrust legislation and litigation put an end to the use of trusts, 
corporate counsel discovered a new route to market domination - the 
power to acquire shares of competitive corporations.66 A New Jersey 
statute drafted by the legislature to attract corporate licensing fees 
represented an enormous change for U.S. business by allowing 
corporations to own stock in other corporations and, as other states 
followed suit, led to the liberalization of corporate formation. 67 By the 
late 1880s, the first modem MNCs in the U.S. emerged.68 
Limited liability had emerged prior to the birth of MN Cs when the 
corporation constituted an enterprise and the stockholders were 
investors in the enterprise in order to protect the investors from the risks 
of business.69 Thus, large corporate groups were being formed by 
corporations purchasing stock of other corporations and the 
"subservient subsidiary corporation and their dominant parent 
shareholder collectively conducted the enterprise."70 The safeguards of 
limited liability were immediately imposed on these new corporations 
without regard to the distinction between limited liability for 
shareholders and that of the parent and subsidiary companies. 71 
This extension of protections has been characterized as illogical by 
some because it overlooks the fact that the "parent corporation and its 
subsidiaries were collectively conducting a common enterprise," that 
the business had been broken down into component parts and that 
limited liability, a doctrine designed to protect investors and not the 
corporation itself, would rrotect each component of the business from 
the obligations of others. 7 Even with this apparent flaw in the system, 
limited liability within MNCs continues today. 
With the ability to own the stock of other corporations, MNCs 
grew rapidly and by the end of World War II the modem MNC, with 
64. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 55. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 56. 
67. Id. 
68. Stephens, supra note 22, at 55. 
69. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 58. 
70. Id. at 58-59. 
71. Id. at 59. 
72. Id. 
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"integrated production across borders, and goods and services flowing 
in multiple directions," had become commonplace.73 
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES WITH REGULATING MNCS 
Regulating MNCs has posed a problem because economic 
incentives are not sufficient to trigger voluntary compliance and the 
legal system has not faired much better.74 The problem stems from the 
fact that corporations are multinational while the legal systems that 
govern them are national.75 To put it another way, the MNCs have 
outgrown the legal structures that govern them, and have, until recently, 
been effectually ungoverned.76 MNCs are incredibly efficient 
economically and, through their coordinated efforts, can far outperform 
smaller domestic businesses.77 MNCs follow a policy of "group profit 
maximization in which the interests of the individual constituent 
members of the group are subordinated to the interests of the parent, 
that is, the group as a whole."78 
The economic power of many MNCs dwarfs that of most nations.79 
For example, based upon 1999 statistics, only eleven nations have a 
larger national budget than Exxon's $100.7 billion yearly revenue.80 
MNCs' economic power brings with it serious political clout and often 
puts MNCs, with their clear goals, in an advantageous position when 
negotiating with often divided govemments.81 
The strength of MNCs makes them difficult to regulate. As MNCs 
become increasingly international they become more unattached from 
their home state and can escape state power.82 Regulation, for the most 
part, is domestic while MN Cs' operations have virtually no borders. 83 
The weakening ties between MNCs and the state allow MNCs to 
become 'denationalized' and stateless.84 "The fact that they have 
73. Stephens, supra note 22, at 53. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. See id. 
77. Id. at 56. 
78. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 139. 
79. See Global Policy Forum, Comparison of Revenues among States and MNCs, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/tncstat2.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2004). 
80. Id. 
81. See Stephens, supra note 22, at 58. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a 
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multiple production facilities means that [MN Cs] can evade state power 
and the constraints of national regulatory schemes by moving their 
operations between their different facilities around the world."85 
The same problem arises with regulation under international law. 86 
Since there is no international forum for regulating MNCs, international 
law sets guidelines for adjudication in domestic legal systems. 87 These 
guidelines generally base the ability of a domestic system to exercise 
jurisdiction over MNCs on contacts with the state seeking to exercise 
jurisdiction or on "home state jurisdiction. "88 "Home state jurisdiction" 
occurs in the state of incorporation, however, when a MNC is composed 
of multiple constituent members, each incorporated in different states, 
and then each member has a different "home state."89 MNCs often use 
this to their advantage and "argue that the parents and the subsidiaries 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the other's home state."90 
The problem of regulation is minimized somewhat by the 
application of enterprise law, which examines the "reality of control, 
decision-making and economic benefit rather that the formalities of 
corporate legal structures."91 Once the reality of economic 
interdependence is unveiled from the "legal fiction of separate corporate 
identities" it becomes evident that the parent and subsidiary 
corporations have been collectively conducting worldwide economic 
enterprises.92 This approach to regulating MNCs recognizes the 
corporation as a whole, rather that a particular subsidiary company, as 
the juridical unit. 93 
Although the enterprise approach was recently used and rejected in 
response to the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India, absent an 
effective international approach, domestic enforcement must step in to 
ensure that corporate human rights abuses do not persist. 94 To be 
effective, domestic regulation must recognize the "reality of economic 
interdependence" or MNCs will continue to avoid regulation in 
People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. POL'Y 1, 8 (1993). 
85. Id. 
86. Stephens, supra note 22, at 88. 
87. See id. at 68. 
88. Id. at 89 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Stephens, supra note 22, at 88. 
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domestic legal systems.95 
In the somewhat shaky world of domestic regulation of MNCs, 
there has been one bright spot in recent years - the A TCA. The A TCA 
is a unique statute that has come to the forefront for regulating MNCs' 
human rights violations because it allows domestic litigation to enforce 
international law.96 MNCs are reachable under the ATCA because it 
grants federal court jurisdiction over a "civil action by an alien for a tort 
only committed in violation of the law of nations or by a treaty of the 
U.S."97 
History of the ATCA 
The ATCA was enacted in 1789, yet it was not adjudicated until 
1900 when the Supreme Court stated in The Paquette Habana decision 
that "international law is part of our law."98 Despite the recognition that 
a violation of international law is a violation of U.S. domestic law, 
international law is continues to be seldom litigated U.S. courts, 
especially when dealing with human rights.99 In 1976, Judge Henry 
Friendly referred to the A TCA as a "legal Lohengrin" because the 
statute was enacted in the first Judiciary Act, yet no one seems to know 
its origin.100 
The A TCA subscribes to the notion that "less is more" and states 
in its entirety: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States."101 The statute was not 
thought of as a tool for prosecuting human rights violators until the 
1980 Filartiga decision. 102 In 1995 the statute gained further distinction 
when the Second Circuit held that it could be used to reach the conduct 
95. Stephens, supra note 22, at 90. 
96. Id. at 85. 
97. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2002). 
98. Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights 
Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 540 (1997). 
99. Id. at 540. 
100. Id. at 543; Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for 
Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 89 (1999) (explaining 
that the description "legal Lohengrin" refers to a myth of a mysterious knight that appears 
on a swan-boat to save a princess on the condition that she not ask him his background; after 
being saved, she surrenders to curiosity and asks him his background; and, as a result, he 
disappears again on his enchanted vessel). 
101. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2002); Zia-Zarifi, supra note 100, at 89. 
102. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 100, at 89; see Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
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of private individuals and not just state actors. 103 
The actual meaning of the statute as well as the drafter's intent has 
been dis~uted, particularly with no legislative history accompanying the 
statute. 1 4 Additionally, the statute's requirement that the tort be 
committed in "violation of the law of nations" has spawned lively 
debate. 105 Some have argued that the ATCA was only intended to 
address one tort, that prohibited by the law of prize, while others have 
argued that while the statute provides jurisdiction it does not provide a 
right of action, and that a suit brought under the A TCA could only 
proceed if a right of action was found either under the law of nations or 
a treaty. 106 The statute's "violation of law of nations" requirement has 
been the subject of such strict scrutiny because it makes U.S. courts 
identify "customary international law, establish [its] contents, and 
enforce [its] provisions in contexts where [it has] seldom, if ever, been 
used" - against MNCs. 107 
Filartiga: A New Outlook 
The 1980 Filartiga v. Pena-Ira/a decision was the first "major 
appellate court interpretation" of the ATCA. 108 In Filartiga, Dr. Joel 
Filartiga, a Paraguayan, and his daughter, Dolly, filed suit alleging that 
Pena-Irala, the former inspector general of the Paraguayan Police, had 
tortured and killed Joelito Filartiga in violation of the law of nations, 
creating an actionable tort under the A TCA. 109 Dolly had been living in 
the U.S. since 1978 under a visitor's visa and was able to serve Pena-
Irala, who had retired and was living in Brooklyn, New York at the 
time. 110 The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 111 The 
Second Circuit held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under the color 
of law" was a violation of international law and that the A TCA 
provided jurisdiction to hear an alien's claim against the alleged 
torturer. 112 
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that the law of nations is 
103. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 100, at 90. 
104. See Walker, supra note 98, at 544. 
105. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 100, at 90. 
106. Walker, supra note 98, at 544. 
107. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 100, at 90--91. 
108. Walker, supra note 98, at 545. 
109. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 878. 
112. Walker, supra note 98, at 546. 
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not fixed and that it must be interpreted as it exists today, not as it was 
in 1789.113 The judges examined contemporary sources of customary 
international law and found torture prohibited by the law of nations and, 
thus, that the ATCA provided jurisdiction.114 The court concluded that 
"the international community has come to recognize the common 
danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human rights and 
particularly the right to be free oftorture."115 
The court's holding in Filartiga represents a modern understanding 
of the A TCA. The decision was monumental in two respects. It 
marked the first time a federal court found it had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate human rights abuses even though the alleged acts occurred in 
another nation and neither party was a U.S. citizen. 116 Furthermore, by 
basing their decision on contemporary customary international law, the 
court established precedent for other courts to do the same. 117 Since 
Filartiga U.S. courts have experienced a drastic increase in ATCA 
cases. All the ATCA cases, except the Tel-Oren decision, have 
reaffirmed the holding in Filartiga that the A TCA provides "both a 
private cause of action and a federal forum where aliens may seek 
redress for violations of international law."118 
Tel-Oren: A Bump in the Road 
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in a 
short per curiam opinion held that the ATCA did not provide subject 
matter jurisdiction for victims of a terrorist attack on a civilian bus in 
Israel committed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. 119 The 
decision was fractured with three concurring opinions and while cited 
widely, the holding does not have much precedental value. 120 Judge 
Bork's concurring opinion, in which he takes a distinctly different 
position than that of the Filartiga Court, has received a particularly fair 
amount of attention. 
In his opinion, Judge Bork stated that the A TCA only confers 
jurisdiction, not a specific cause of action, and that a cause of action 
113. Walker, supra note 98, at 546; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
114. Id. 
115. Filartiga, 630 F .2d at 890. 
116. Walker, supra note 98, at 546-47. 
117. Id. at 547. 
118. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847. 
119. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
120. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 100, at 103. 
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would have to come from a source other than the ATCA. 121 He further 
explained that Congress could provide a specific cause of action for 
torture, but it had not, and that customary international law did not 
provide one either. 122 Judge Bork also stated that the only proper causes 
of action under the A TCA are those that the drafters of the Act would 
have had in mind, namely "piracy, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and violations of the laws of safe conduct."123 
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected 
Judge Bork's position and held that a "tort in violation of international 
law is actionable" under the A TCA and is not restricted to the law of 
nations as of 1789 .124 The Eleventh Circuit addressed Judge Bork's 
opinion explicitly in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo and held that an Ethiopian 
defendant was liable under the A TCA for torture he committed while 
working for the Ethiopian government. 125 Specifically, the court stated 
that the statute does not require a "separate enabling statute as a 
precondition to relief' under the A TCA and that "the [A TCA] 
establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common 
law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international 
law."126 While Tel-Oren first appeared to be a set back for human rights 
plaintiffs, it, in actuality, led to Congress ratifying the Filartiga holding 
in enacting The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).127 
The Torture Victim Protection Act: Solidifying the Path 
In passing the TVP A, Congress ratified the Filartiga holding and 
rejected Judge Bork's argument in Tel-Oren that the A TCA only 
confers jurisdiction and does not create a cause of action.128 Congress 
intended the TVP A to compliment the ATCA and not alter it. 129 This 
statute was meant to provide an additional basis upon which claims of 
torture and extrajudicial killings may be made. 13° Congress noted that 
the TVP A provided the specific grant of a private right of action before 
121. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801; Walker, supra note 98, at 547. 
122. Walker, supra note 98, at 548. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847. 
126. Id. at 847--48. 
127. Rachel E. Schwartz, And Tomorrow? The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 Aruz. 
J. lNT' L & COMP. L. 271, 283 (1994). 
128. Wiwa II, 226 F.3d at 104. 
129. See id. 
130. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV.8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 
319887, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Wiwa 1]. 
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U.S. courts that Judge Bork felt was lacking. 131 Specifically, Congress 
stated that the TVP A "would establish an unambiguous and modem 
basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under 
an existing law, [the ATCA], which permits federal district courts to 
hear claims by aliens for torts committed 'in violation of the law of 
nations. "'132 The TVP A makes clear that Congress intended U.S. courts 
to play an important role in enforcing the law of nations and providing 
redress to human rights victims. 
Kadic v. Karadzic: A Step in the Right Direction 
The Second Circuit decision in Kadic v. Karadzic was a significant 
expansion of the A TCA. In Kadic, the court held that the A TCA 
applies to private parties, or non-state actors, to the extent that either 
"their conduct. .. [was] under the color of state authority or violates a 
norm of international law that is recognized as extending to the conduct 
of private parties."133 This case involved claims brought by Croatian 
and Muslim citizens of Bosnia as "victims and ... [on behalf] of victims 
of various atrocities, including brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, 
force impregnation, torture, and summary execution," committed by the 
Bosnian-Serb military during the Bosnian Civil War. 134 Karadzic, the 
president of the self-proclaimed Bosnia-Serb republic, had command 
authority over the military and he, as part of a genocidal campaign, 
directed the military to commit the injuries plaintiffs complained of. 135 
The court found that the contemporary understanding of the law of 
nations is not confined to state action and that certain forms of conduct 
violate the law of nations whether taken by a state or a private 
individual.136 The court also found that genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity are crimes that, in accordance with customary 
international law, non-states actors could commit. 137 
According to the Kadic decision, there are two ways that a private 
individual can be held liable under the A TCA: under color of authority, 
when he "acts together with state officials or with significant state aid," 
or if he acts alone and he commits acts so serious that they violate }us 
131. H.R. REP. No. 102-367 at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86, cited 
in Abebe-Jira, 72 F .3d at 848. 
132. Id. at 3. 
133. Wiwa II, 226 F.3d at 104; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
134. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37. 
135. Id. at 237. 
136. Walker, supra note 98, at 549. 
137. Id. at 550. 
15
Taylor: Exxon Mobil, human rights violations
Published by SURFACE, 2004
288 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 31:2 
cogens: genocide, piracy, slavery, and war crimes.138 However, it is 
important to note that torture is "proscribed by international law only 
when committed by state officials or under color oflaw."139 
Kadic expanded the scope of liability under the A TCA and left it 
open for future enlargements. In fact, after Kadic, courts recognized the 
potential of extending ATCA liability to MNCs. 140 In this regard, 
financial ties between corporate and state actors are sufficient to meet 
the "under color of official authority" requirement. 141 Furthermore, 
since most resource extraction companies like, Exxon Mobil, are 
responsible for the majority of a developing country's exports, it is 
highly unlikely that they would not have ties to its host state's domestic 
activities. 142 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: One Foot in Front of the Other 
Wiwa illustrates the final procedural obstacle to obtaining domestic 
jurisdiction over MNCs: forum non conveniens.143 As stated earlier, 
domestic legal systems are ill-equipped to regulate MNCs, whose 
operations know no boundaries.144 One common strategy used by 
MNCs to escape liability in domestic courts is forum non conveniens. 145 
The plaintiffs in Wiwa were former citizens and residents of the 
Ogoni region of Nigeria, where most of the country's oil is found. 146 A 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendants, Shell Petroleum Company 
of Nigeria was conducting oil exploration and development in the 
138. Matthew R. Skolnik, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims 
Act Cases: A Shell of its Former Self After Wiwa, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 187, 196-97 
(2002); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999) (definingjus cogens as a mandatory 
nonn of general international law from which no two or more nations may exempt 
themselves or release one another). 
139. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. 
140. Saunders, supra note 23, at 1444. 
141. See Skolnik, supra note 138, at 199. 
142. See id. at 198. 
143. The scope of this note is too narrow to go into all of the claims presented in the 
Wiwa complaint and will, therefore, just touch on the major issues with respect to the claims 
brought forth in the Exxon Mobil case. 
144. See Stephens, supra note 22, at 53. 
145. Skolnik, supra note 138, at 201 (explaining that a U.S. district court, if there is no 
real U.S. interest in the case, is allowed to dismiss the case under the forum non conveniens 
doctrine in favor of a fair and convenient foreign forum if it bears some relation to the case. 
The Supreme Court, in Gilbert v. Reyno, explained that the court must detennine whether an 
adequate alternative forum exists. If they detennine one does exist, then the court weighs 
"the private interests of the parties in the competing forums and any public interests at 
stake"). 
146. Wiwa I, 2002 WL 319887, at *1. 
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Ogoni region. 147 A protest movement developed among the Ogoni 
because Shell Nigeria allegedly "coercively appropriated land" without 
proper compensation and caused "substantial pollution."148 Shell 
Nigeria recruited the Nigerian police and military to suppress the 
opposition group and ensure that the development activities proceeded 
"as usual."149 The plaintiffs sued on behalf of members of the 
opposition group who were arrested, detained, tortured, and then killed 
by the Nigerian police and military recruited by Shell Nigeria. 150 The 
defendants allegedly provided "money, weapons, and logistical support 
to the Nigerian military."151 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
suit on the basis of forum non conveniens and failure to state a claim. 152 
The trial court granted Defendant's motion for forum non 
conveniens dismissal and listed England as an "adequate alternative 
forum." However, this dismissal was later reversed by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 153 The Court of Appeals noted that a 
plaintiffs' choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 154 While 
Plaintiffs were not U.S. citizens, two of the four plaintiffs were living in 
the U.S. when the case was filed, and the court's deference to a 
plaintiffs choice of forum "increases as the plaintiffs ties to the forum 
increase."155 The court further noted that the district court did not 
properly consider the U.S. interest in adjudicating human rights 
violations. 156 Congress intended the TVP A to codify Filartiga and 
expressed an undeniable U.S. interest of justice in hearing cases 
involving violations of international human rights law. 157 This interest 
of justice is lost if human rights cases are dismissed for alternative 
forums. 158 
This decision is particularly significant because it weakens a 
procedural tool often employed by MNCs - forum non conveniens. The 
court in Wiwa outlined a statutory basis for granting forum non 
conveniens dismissals only when "the defendant has fully met the 
147. Wiwa II, 226 F.3d at 92. 
148. Id. at 92. 
149. Wiwa I, 2002 WL 319887, at *2. 
150. Wiwa II, 226 F.3d at 92. 
151. Id. at 92-93. 
152. Id. at 94. 
153. Id. at 94-95. 
154. Id. at 103. 
155. Skolnik, supra note 138, at 210. 
156. Wiwa II, 226 F .3d at 106. 
157. Id. at 105. 
158. See Skolnik, supra note 138, at 211. 
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burden of showing that the Gilbert factors tilt strongly" in their favor. 159 
It is unlikely that a case similar to Wiwa will be dismissed onforum non 
conveniens grounds in the future given the significant deference the 
court gave to the plaintiffs' choice of forum, the heavy burden the 
defendant has to meet to be granted dismissal, "and the clearly 
expressed policy objectives of the TVPA."160 
The district court ruled on February 28, 2002 to deny Defendants' 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 161 As stated earlier, 
torture is "proscribed by international law only when committed by 
state officials or under color of law."162 The court found Plaintiffs' 
allegation that Defendants were financing and participating in the 
torture and killing of activists was sufficient to support a claim that 
Defendants were joint actors with the Nigerian police and military. As 
a result, the court found that Defendants acted "under color oflaw."163 
John Doe v. Unocal Corporation: The Light at the End of the Tunnel? 
In 1988, a new military government, the "Myanmar military," took 
control of Burma and renamed the country Myanmar. 164 The Myanmar 
military formed Myanmar Oil and, in 1992, licensed Total, a French 
company, "to produce, transport, and sell natural gas" extracted from 
Myanmar's coast. 165 Later that year, Unocal acquired an interest from 
Total in the Myanmar Project ("Project"). 166 In order to transport the 
extracted gas, Unocal and Total constructed a pipeline "from the coast 
of Myanmar through the interior of the country to Thailand."167 
Plaintiffs, villagers from the Tenasserim province of Myanmar, 
filed suit under the A TCA against Unocal for human rights violations 
that allegedly occurred in connection with the construction of the 
pipeline. 168 Specifically, they allege that Unocal "directly or indirectly 
subjected villagers to forced labor, murder, rape, and torture" by the 
159. Wiwa II, 226 F.3d at 106; Skolnik, supra note 138, at 214. 
160. Skolnik, supra note 138, at 214. 
161. Wiwa L 2002 WL 319887, at *I. 
162. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. 
163. WiwaL 2002 WL 319887, at *13. 
164. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *1 (9th Cir. 2002) 
[hereinafter Unocal II]. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. Total, Myanmar Oil, Unocal, and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand 
Exploration and Production each had an interest in the project. Id. Unocal, in particular, had 
a 28% interest in the project. Id. 
167. Unocal II, 2002 WL 31063976, at *I. 
168. Id. at *I. 
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Myanmar military who they hired as security for the construction of a 
gas pipeline through the region. 169 Defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which was granted by the district court and 
overturned on appeal. 170 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision on 
September 18, 2002 allowing Plaintiffs' claims to go forward. 171 In its 
decision, the court held there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact whether the Project directed the Myanmar military 
in their security activities and whether Unocal was involved in their 
direction. 172 The court also held that Unocal was made aware of the 
Myanmar military' s history of human rights violations prior to investing 
in the Project and was aware of allegations that violations were 
occurring in connection to the project after they had invested.173 Lastly, 
the court held that Unocal could be held directly liable for knowingly 
aiding and abetting the military in perpetrating forced labor along with 
the other alleged abuses. 174 
The majority stated that the correct standard to apply was an 
international law standard recently used by the ad hoc criminal tribunals 
in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 175 Judge Reinhardt, in his concurring 
opinion, agreed that Plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to survive 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, but felt that the applicable 
standard for third party liability was agency, joint venture, and reckless 
disregard. 176 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision appears is a 
major breakthrough for holding MNCs liable for complicity in human 
rights violations. However, the future impact of the Ninth Circuit 
decision is unclear because on February 14, 2003 the court issued an 
order stating that the case is scheduled to be reheard en banc. 177 
169. Unocal II, 2002 WL 31063976, at *1. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at *3-4. 
173. Id. 
174. Unocal II, 2002 WL 31063976 at *9; International Labor Rights Fund, News and 
Press, Plaintiffs Win Ninth Circuit Victory over Unocal (Sept. 18, 2002), at 
http://www.laborrights.org/press/unocal091802.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (discussing 
the court's rejection of the classic Nuremberg defense, "we are not liable because we were 
not holding the gun"). 
175. Unocal JI, 2002 WL 31063976, at *12. 
176. Id. at *24. 
177. Id. at * 1. Parties argued June 17, 2003; however, the case was ordered withdrawn 
from submission on December 9, 2003 pending issuance of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2003 WL 22070605. Id. 
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Exxon Mobil: A Case for Accountability 
On June 20, 2001, eleven villagers filed an A TCA claim for human 
rights abuses by the TNI who served as Exxon Mobil's security forces 
in Aceh, Indonesia. 178 Aceh is an area with a history of civil unrest. 179 
In particular, factions of the Acehnese have sought independence from 
Indonesian rule over the years resulting in violent clashes with the 
Indonesian government. 18° Consequently, security was an important 
aspect of Exxon Mobil's project in the area and became even more 
important when their involvement with the Indonesian government 
became public knowledge. 181 
The plaintiffs are victims and the survivors of victims who were 
"subjected to genocide, murder, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual 
violence, and kidnapping" by the TNI, who were operating in Aceh 
under the auspices of security for Exxon Mobil. 182 Plaintiffs allege that 
Exxon Mobil aided and abetted the atrocities through financial and 
other "material support" to the forces. 183 More specifically, Exxon 
Mobil and its predecessors in interest are alleged to not only have 
financed the TNI unit in the area, but also "controlled and directed" the 
activities of the security forces and made decisions concerning the 
location of bases, strategic mission planning, and specific deployment 
areas. 184 In its defense, Exxon Mobil filed a motion to dismiss. 185 
MNCs rely on four policy concerns as defenses to ATCA liability 
in addition to standard procedural defenses, such as forum non 
conveniens. 186 The first defense is that the broad scope of international 
178. Complaint, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
179. Michael Shari, Indonesia: What did Mobil Know? Bus. WK., Dec. 28, 1998, at 68 
(discussing the separatist rebellion in Aceh and its beginnings four centuries prior against 
Dutch colonial rule). 
180. Id. (explaining that the Indonesian government angered the Acehnese by favoring 
ethnic Javanese for most high level jobs and contracts in area oil and gas extraction and, 
despite horrific local poverty, investing less than 10% of Aceh's wealth back into the 
region). 
181. See Complaint, supra note 6, at 14. 
182. Id. at 1. 
183. Id. at 14-16; Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at 2, at http://www.laborrights.org (last visited Mar. 19, 
2004). 
184. Complaint, supra note 6, at 15. 
185. International Labor Rights Fund, Exxon Mobil: Genocide, Murder, and Torture in 
Aceh, Indonesia, at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/exxon/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2004). 
186. See Plaintiffs Memo in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
179; see also Terry Collingsworth, The Alien Torts Claim Act - A Vital Tool For Preventing 
Corporations from Violating Fundamental Human Rights 2-5, at http://www.laborrights.org 
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law will make it impossible for companies to know what behavior may 
subject them to liability. 187 The second is that MNCs will be held liable 
for the conduct of foreign governments who commit human rights 
violations simply because they have invested in those countries. 188 The 
third is that trial attorneys will reap huge rewards for frivolous claims 
filed under the A TCA. 189 Finally, the fourth defense is that liability 
under the ATCA will discourage MNCs from foreign investment. 190 
Scope of International Law 
MNCs facing liability under the ATCA often argue that the scope 
of international law is so broad that if liability is found under the A TCA 
good intentioned companies wishing to do business abroad would be 
unable to know exactly what conduct might subject them to liability. 191 
However, the ATCA specifically addresses only violations of the "law 
of nations."192 A crime, to be considered a violation of the law of 
nations, must be encompassed in customary international law, which 
requires a significant degree of international consensus. 193 Furthermore, 
crimes that constitute a violation of the law of nations have specifically 
been defined as "genocide, war crimes, extrajudicial killing, slavery, 
torture, unlawful detention, and crimes against humanity."194 Therefore, 
this defense fails to raise a significant policy concern. 
The limitations on the applicability of the A TCA ease any concern 
a MNC has about inadvertently subjecting themselves to liability. The 
crimes that are encompassed by the statute are clearly defined and 
represent a class of crimes that is in "extreme derogation" of 
international standards. 195 These are not crimes that one may 
inadvertently commit. 196 Indeed, to be considered a party in an A TCA 
suit, the MNC would have to be directly involved in violating 
"fundamental human rights."197 Therefore, most companies investing 
abroad are conscientious actors and are simply not going to engage in 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2004). 




191. Collingsworth, supra note 186, at 2-5. 
192. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2002). 
193. Id. 
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any business practice that will subject them to liability under the 
ATCA.19s 
Liability for a Country's Conduct Based Upon Investment 
Another argument often made by a MNC seeking to avoid liability 
under the ATCA is that MNCs who invest in countries committing 
violations will be held liable for the country's behavior simply because 
of their investments and projects in that country. 199 While the concern 
is understandable, especially for a company such as Exxon Mobil who 
invested $3.5 billion in one project alone last year, the argument is 
unfounded.200 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals directly addressed 
this argument and held that an MNC cannot face liability for simply 
investing in a country headed by an ill-behaved leader.201 Rather, to 
face liability, the party must be a direct perpetrator of the crime or 
knowingly be aiding and abetting the party committing the crime. 202 
Frivolous Claims Equaling Huge Verdicts 
MNCs also argue that it is unfair to subject them to liability under 
the A TCA because trial lawyers would be able to convert frivolous 
claims into enormous jury awards.203 However, there is simply no basis 
for this argument. Courts have not hesitated to dismiss cases that fail to 
provide the requisite links between the MNC and the alleged human 
rights violation.204 Furthermore, MNCs named as defendants in ATCA 
cases have the resources to acquire the best legal counsel in the country 
and to defend themselves vigorously.205 If the claims are baseless, they 
will be dismissed. 
Foreign Investment 
One of the strongest policy considerations offered by MNCs 
against A TCA liability is that liability will discourage foreign 
198. See Collingsworth, supra note 186, at 2. 
199. Id. at 3. 
200. Jerry Useem, Exxon's African Adventure; How to Build a $3.5 Billion Pipeline -
with the 'Help' of NGOs, the World Bank, and Yes, Chicken Sacrifices, FORTUNE, Apr. 15, 
2002, at 102. 
201. See Collingsworth, supra note 186, at 3. 
202. Unocal II, 2002 WL 31063976, at *10. 
203. Collingsworth, supra note 186, at 4. 
204. Id. at 4; see, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 
1997), aff'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
205. Collingsworth, supra note 186, at 5. 
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investment and result in the loss of foreign investment opportunities.206 
This was the principal justification for immunity from ATCA liability 
offered by William H. Taft IV, the Department of State's Legal 
Advisor, in a letter to the presiding judge in the Exxon Mobil 
litigation.207 Mr. Taft, in response to Judge Oberdorfer's invitation, 
stated that the Department believed that adjudication of the Exxon 
Mobil dispute could have serious effects on U.S. interests, such as 
discouraging relations between the U.S. and Indonesian governments 
and curtailing U.S. businesses' success in attaining public and private 
contracts in Indonesia. 208 
Harold Koh, an expert in the field of international law, stated that 
these justifications overlook an essential U.S. interest, namely, 
guaranteeing that U.S. corporations abide by international human rights 
obligations in their business activities abroad.209 Koh explains that all 
three branches of the U.S. government have "consistently maintained 
that an honest and public scrutiny of Indonesia's human rights record 
that truthfully chronicles military and police abuse does not 
inappropriately intrude into Indonesian sovereignty or interfere with 
U.S. policy towards Indonesia."210 Specifically, the State Department's 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has consistently 
criticized the human rights record of the Indonesian military and 
condemned the Indonesian government for not taking "action to prevent 
and punish human rights violations, including [those] in Aceh."211 
Additionally, Congress, after determining that U.S.-Indonesian relations 
would not be adversely affected, condemned human rights abuses in 
Indonesia and "suspended military assistance to Indonesia" for the 
majority of the past decade because of their military' s history of human 
rights abuses.212 Moreover, federal courts have held high-ranking 
Indonesian military personnel directly responsible in the past for 
206. See Collingsworth, supra note 186, at 3. 
207. Id. at Attachment A. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at Attachment C. Mr. Koh served as Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the U.S. State Department from 1998-
2001. While with the State Department, he monitored human rights issues in Indonesia and 
supervised the preparation of the 1998 and 1999 Country Report for Human Rights 
Practices concerning Indonesia. He now is the Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith 
Professor of International Law at Yale Law School and has currently written over eighty 
articles and book chapters on international law, foreign relations, constitutional law, and 
human rights. Id. 
210. Collingsworth, supra note 186, at Attachment C. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at Attachment C; S. Res. 91, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted). 
23
Taylor: Exxon Mobil, human rights violations
Published by SURFACE, 2004
296 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 31:2 
violations of human rights that occurred within Indonesia's borders.213 
Koh also addresses the inconsistency in the argument for immunity 
from liability due to fear of possible prejudices by the Indonesian 
government towards U.S. corporations seeking contracts and the 
position taken by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.214 In 
particular, the fact that a foreign company may be able to secure an 
investment or business opportunity over an American company because 
they are free to engage in bribery or corruption has never been held to 
be a sufficient reason for an American court to decline to prosecute an 
American company under the Corrupt Practices Act.215 Following the 
same logic, the fact that a foreign corporation may employ security 
practices in violation of international law to win a contract over a U.S. 
corporation is not a sufficient reason for American courts to decline to 
prosecute an American corporation for committing human rights 
violations under the ATCA.216 
Fifty members of Congress expressed their concerns regarding Mr. 
Taft's statements in a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell.217 They 
feared Mr. Taft's statements illustrated a wavering commitment to the 
continuation of the A TCA and the TVP A as a viable solution for the 
adjudication of legitimate human rights claims.218 In particular, they 
felt Mr. Taft's comments were in conflict with the objectives of the 
ATCA and the TVPA.219 Moreover, they felt that Mr. Taft's letter, in 
conjunction with other action by the Department of State, appeared to 
suggest an effort by the executive branch to "unilaterally effectuate a de 
facto repeal of the A TCA and the TVP A. ,,iio Congress passed the 
TVP A for the particular purpose of adjudicating "legitimate human 
rights claims committed abroad" and stated that its undoing would 
weaken the United States' ability to promote a "climate of respect for 
human rights" in Indonesia and elsewhere.221 Accusations of human 
rights violations may be ill received by foreign governments, but 
Congress decided that U.S. courts should hear such claims, and did not 
give the executive branch veto power over such litigation. 222 




217. Id. at Attachment B. 




222. Id. at Attachment C. 
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Procedural Defenses 
It is unlikely that the Exxon case will be dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds given the significant deference given to plaintiffs 
choice of forum, the heavy burden the defendant has to meet to be 
granted dismissal, and the clearly expressed intent for the U.S. to serve 
as a forum for violations of human rights law.223 Furthermore, a 
suitable alternative forum will be difficult to find since Indonesia has a 
history of shielding individuals suspected of perpetrating human rights 
violations and the strong ties between Exxon Mobil and Washington 
D.C., which make jurisdiction proper.224 
V. CONCLUSION 
"In the modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations have 
combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for 
fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective 
interest."225 MNCs are the driving force of the global economy and 
gaining control over MNCs' unrestricted power and imposing 
regulations that force accountability for human rights abuses is "a small 
but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all 
people from brutal violence. "226 
223. See Wiwa II, 226 F.3d at 100-06; Skolnik, supra note 138, at 214. 
224. See S. Res 91, 107th Cong. (2001); Complaint, supra note 6, at 7-9 (discussing 
Exxon Mobil's connections to the city, including places of business, shareholders 
residences, and lobbying efforts with the federal government). 
225. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890. 
226. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890; Stephens, supra note 22, at 90. 
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